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HUNTING A DICTATOR AS A
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS:
THE INTERNALIZATION PROBLEM
AND THE HISSÈNE HABRÉ CASE
Caleb J. Stevens*
“So if the question is ‘why do nations obey international law?’, my
answer would be: Nations obey because of people like us—
lawyers and citizens who care about international law, who
choose not to leave the law at the water’s edge, who do their
utmost to ‘bring international law home.’”1
-Harold Hongju Koh

ABSTRACT
Transnational legal process theory suffers from an
internalization problem: it does not adequately explain why
international legal norms are internalized.
This article
addresses the gap by analyzing the Habré case in Senegal as an
example of transnational legal process. Utilizing speech act
and securitization theories, I argue that internalization can be
partly explained by three factors of agency: (1) the validity of
the claim, (2) linguistic competence, and (3) discursive
strategies. Positing that the claim in the Habré case is
sufficiently valid per se, I find multiple actors commanding
linguistic competence and employing a variety of discursive
strategies. I conclude that the agents of internalization have
been stymied by the linguistic competence and discursive
* B.A., Illinois Wesleyan University; J.D., University of Illinois College of
Law; MIS, Graduate Institute of International and Development
Studies/Institut de Hautes Études Internationales et du Développement. I
would like to thank Reed Brody and Hélen Boyer of Human Rights Watch
and Professors Pierre Hazan and Andrea Bianchi for their invaluable
support, as well as Professor Keith Krause for introducing me to
securitization theory. I am also deeply indebted to Messrs. Assane Ndiaye,
Bachir Fofana, Djibril Aziz Badiane, Aboubacry Mbodj, and others who
generously gave their time for interviews during my research trip to Senegal
in 2009.
1 Harold Hongju Koh, Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L.
REV. 623, 679–80 (1998) [hereinafter Koh, Home].
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strategies of counter-agents of internalization, especially
Senegalese religious leaders.
I. INTRODUCTION
To write this sentence, this introduction, this article is to
participate in a transnational process of legal creation and
compliance. I am, in a sense, one of the many voices working to
both ensure state compliance with international law and its
creation, in this case, through the prosecution of Hissène
Habré. As suggested by the above quote, for Koh and other
transnational legal process theorists, international law is a
product of a constructivist, dynamic, non-statist, and highly
participatory process requiring an interdisciplinary approach.2
Koh is not alone in articulating an intensely dynamic and non-statist
theory of international law. Koh’s cohorts are overwhelmingly associated
with Yale Law School, an association which caused one scholar to speculate
on the appropriateness of labeling them a ‘New’ New Haven School. See
Laura A. Dickinson, Toward a “New” New Haven School of International
Law?, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 547, 548–49 (2007). This inchoate ‘New’ New
Haven School shares several features with its forbearer, the New Haven
School: normative commitments to the rule of law and fundamental human
rights, flexibility with respect to non-state actors, and an empirical and
interdisciplinary approach to international law. Id. at 549–51 (“I would like
to suggest . . . that the work of this younger generation of scholars within the
orbit of New Haven does, at least, share a number of important features that
might qualify it as a new school of thought about international law—and
interestingly, these features echo aspects of the original New Haven
School.”). See also Harold Hongju Koh, Is There a “New” New Haven School
of International Law?, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 559, 565–71 (2007) [hereinafter
Koh, New Haven]. For an example of works by possible members of the ‘New’
New Haven School, see Elena Baylis, Reassessing the Role of International
Criminal Law: Rebuilding National Courts Through Transnational
Networks, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2009); Paul Schiff Berman, From International
Law to Law and Globalization, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 485 (2005);
Anupam Chander, Globalization and Distrust, 114 YALE L.J. 1193 (2005);
Janet Koven Levit, Bottom-Up International Lawmaking: Reflections on the
New Haven School of International Law, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 393 (2007).
Thus, the double modifier is a sort of homage to the New Haven School, two
of whose founding members, Myers McDougal and Harold Laswell, argued
that any accurate international legal theory requires an understanding of two
key elements: (1) law as a product of diverse societal, legal, and power
processes that (2) should move towards a “universal order of human dignity.”
Myers S. McDougal & Harold D. Laswell, The Identification and Appraisal of
Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT’L L. 53 (1959), reprinted in
INTERNATIONAL RULES: APPROACHES FROM INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 122 (Robert J. Beck et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter
APPROACHES]. The New Haven School incorporated extra-legal processes of
2
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Through our collective participation in this process, we give
international law its normative shape over time.3 Put simply,
international law is what we make it. In a recent lecture Koh
remarked, “[w]e live in an era when anyone with an internet
connection can participate in international law-making.”4 Koh
is the great leveler, for international law is no longer the
exclusive province of governmental actors and treaty
conferences. Through a transnational legal process framework,
one sees agents of international law-making and compliance in
academics writing blogs, Facebook posts by protesters, activists
in Arab states providing the world with news of their
governments’ human rights violations, and teams of
international lawyers roaming the globe looking for states that
harbor former dictators and international criminals. It goes
without saying that this view is not shared by everyone.5
There are indeed shortcomings to transnational legal
process theory. Although Koh has produced a litany of articles
on transnational legal process,6 his notion of the “vertical
society and power influenced by, and in turn influencing, the process of lawcreation. APPROACHES, supra at 110. They removed the legal positivist
quarantine between law and politics and reframed international law as a
dynamic process with a normative end rather than a static object to be
identified and labeled. Id. at 110–11. Transnational legal process theory is
continuing the New Haven School’s work by allowing more and varied actors
into international legal theory to help explain state compliance in today’s
“fourth era” of international law. Harold Hongju Koh, A World Transformed,
20 YALE J. INT’L L. ix, ix (1995).
3 See Roda Mushkat, Dissecting International Legal Compliance: An
Unfinished Odyssey, 38 DENVER J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 161, 170 (2009).
4 Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. State Dep’t, Address at the
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies: International
Law in the Obama Administration (Nov. 10, 2009).
5 See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith & Stephen D. Krasner, The Limits of Idealism,
132 DAEDALUS 47, 47–48 (2003); Eric A. Posner, Transnational Legal Process
and the Supreme Court’s 2003-2004 Term: Some Skeptical Observations, 12
TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 23, 25 (2004); Melissa A. Waters, Normativity in
the “New” Schools: Assessing the Legitimacy of International Legal Norms
Created by Domestic Courts, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 455, 456–57 (2007)
(reiterating concerns over the normative commitments of the New Haven
School as improperly subordinating law to policy and pointing out that
transnational legal process also gives rise to these misgivings).
6 E.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100
YALE L.J. 2347 (1991) [hereinafter Koh, Litigation]; Harold Hongju Koh,
Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996) [hereinafter Koh,
Process]; Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106
YALE L.J. 2599 (1997) [hereinafter Koh, Nations]; Harold Hongju Koh, Is
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internalization”7 of international law remains incomplete.8
Specifically, he has not adequately explained why states
internalize certain international legal norms.9 This article
addresses the internalization problem by examining a case of
transnational legal process at work—the efforts by Reed Brody
of Human Rights Watch, who brandishes the moniker “The
Dictator Hunter,”10 and others to prosecute former Chadian
President Hissène Habré in Senegal for torture and other
international crimes. What does an examination of efforts to
hunt the dictator Hissène Habré teach us about transnational
legal process as a theory of state compliance? In hazarding an
answer to this question, I hope to make a not insignificant
contribution to transnational legal process theory and, by
extension, the literature on state compliance with international
law.
Building on Balzacq’s critique of securitization theory, I
claim that the internalization of an international legal norm
can be partly explained by three factors of agency: (1) the
validity of the claim, (2) the linguistic competence of the agents
International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998); Harold
Hongju Koh, Internalization Through Socialization, 54 DUKE L.J. 975 (2005)
[hereinafter Koh, Internalization]; Harold Hongju Koh, Why Transnational
Law Matters, 24 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 745 (2006); Koh, New Haven, supra
note 2.
7 As will be explained in more detail, Koh distinguishes between vertical
and horizontal internalization. See infra Part II(2). Horizontal internalization is a classical, uncontested concept, whereas vertical internalization
presents a problem. Therefore, when I refer to an unmodified
“internalization,” I mean “vertical internalization.”
8 See Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law,
International Relations and Compliance, in THE HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 544 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2002).
9 Id. Although Koh has illustrated his theory with several examples,
none of these examples are sufficiently in-depth analyses. To support his
theory, Koh has discussed several cases, namely, the campaign to ban
landmines, the US support for the Contra rebels in Nicaragua, and the US
Haitian refugee policy in the early 1990s. Harold Hongju Koh, Can the
President Be Torturer in Chief?, 81 IND. L.J. 1145 (2006) [hereinafter Koh,
Torturer]; Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process after September
11th, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 337, 340 (2004) [hereinafter Koh, September];
Harold Hongju Koh, Refugees, the Courts, and the New World Order, 1994
UTAH L. REV. 999, 1013–18 (1994).
10 This nickname derives from the documentary film eponymously titled,
“The Dictator Hunter.” CHASSEUR DE DICTATEURS [THE DICTATOR HUNTER]
(Pierre Hazan Film & Video TV 2001).
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of internalization, and (3) their discursive strategies. Koh’s
stated aim is for internalization to explain the “micro-processes
of social influence” that induce states to comply with
international law.11 By focusing on the elemental factors of
agency, I hope to reveal a kind of nano-process beneath these
micro-processes.12 An elucidation of that nano-process can help
explain the internalization of international legal norms.
Having said what this article is about, I will now note what
it is not about. As Michael Walzer opined, “[t]ell your readers
what you are not going to do; it will relieve their minds, and
they will be more inclined to accept what seems a modest
project.”13 This article does not argue, as a general proposition,
that transnational legal process theory is superior to other
compliance theories, even in its explanation of the Habré case.
Transnational legal process is a powerful theory for explaining
the Habré case, but I do not contend it is the only one. Nor
does it offer a comprehensive application of Balzacq to explain
vertical internalization. Rather, this article aims to
demonstrate that transnational legal process is a powerful,
albeit flawed, theory for explaining the complex realities in
which international legal compliance occurs and, more
specifically, for understanding the Habré case. The flaw lies
with the internalization component and linking transnational
legal process theory with part of Balzacq’s critique of
securitization helps correct for this flaw. I also suggest that a
more thorough linkage with Balzacq will prove an even better
corrective.
This article is organized as follows. Part II briefly touches
on competing explanations for international legal compliance
and adumbrates transnational legal process theory. Part III
lays out the insights provided by speech act and securitization
theories as well as why and how these theories can improve our
understanding of internalization in a transnational legal
Koh, Internalization, supra note 6, at 977.
For an example of another work that looks to a kind of nano-process
based on language, see Andrea Bianchi, The Role of Non-State Actors in the
Globalization of Human Rights: An International Lawyer’s Perspective, in
GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT THE STATE 193–94 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997)
(arguing that human rights are enforced through discursive practices by the
media that “code” actions as legal or illegal).
13 MICHAEL WALZER, ON TOLERATION 8 (1997).
11
12
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process. Part IV demonstrates the soundness of the proposition
that the Habré case exemplifies transnational legal process at
work. Part V is the meat of the article, relying on interviews
and media reports to support the validity of the claim:
linguistic competence and discursive strategies can help
explain efforts to induce Senegal to internalize international
legal norms in the Habré case. Part VI concludes with a review
of the article’s shortcomings and suggests future lines of
inquiry that may address them.
II. COMPLIANCE AND TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS
Writings on international legal compliance are concerned
with one overriding question: why do nations obey
international law? As Louis Henkin put it, “[i]t is probably the
case that almost all nations observe almost all principles of
international law and almost all of their obligations almost all
of the time.”14 Compliance theories attempt to explain why this
is so.
A. Why Do States Comply With International Law?
There are many answers to this question. Realists argue
that compliance is merely a coincidence of states’ interests
being aligned with international law, that international law
has a negligible influence on state compliance.15 Moore and
Guzman argue that state compliance with international law
“signals” information that is not directly observable to other
states.16 States decide to engage in signaling based on an
analysis of the costs and benefits associated with signaling
compliance to other states.17 For Thomas Franck, compliance
is induced by the pull of a rule’s substantive and procedural
fairness.18 According to Chayes and Chayes, state compliance
14 LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 47 (2d
ed. 1979) (emphasis omitted).
15 JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 15, 225 (2005); Goldsmith & Krasner, supra note 5; Posner, supra note 5,
at 25–26.
16 David H. Moore, A Signaling Theory of Human Rights Compliance, 97
NW. U. L. REV. 879, 882–83 (2003).
17 Id. at 885–87.
18 THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS
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with treaty regimes, which is their sole focus, results from
three factors: efficiency, interests, and norms.19 These factors
operate within a “new sovereignty” state system in which
states are bound in a tight web of international connections
and transactions that render them susceptible to persuasion.20
In a similar vein, transnational network theory addresses
the increased influence of transnational advocacy networks and
the concomitant altering of state sovereignty. Transnational
network theory posits that human rights norms become
internalized (Risse and Sikkink prefer the term “socializ[ed]”)21
in states as a result of transnational advocacy networks
connecting with domestic actors who provide information on
state non-compliance with international legal norms.22 Once
alerted, transnational advocacy networks link up with
international regimes, pressure the norm-violating state, and
mobilize international organizations and other states to apply
pressure as well.23
Another notable contribution to the compliance debate is
Goodman and Jinks’ notion of acculturation, defined as “the
general process by which actors adopt the beliefs and
behavioral patterns of the surrounding culture.”24 According to
this view, explanations of compliance fixated on coercion or
persuasion do not adequately account for the complex social
environment in which social and legal norms are transmitted.25
The effects of acculturation are observable when actors in the
target state identify with a particular group and feel cognitive
and social pressure to conform to that group.26
7 (1995).
19 ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 4 (1995).
20 Id. at 25–26.
21 Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization of International
Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction, in THE POWER OF
HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE 5 (Thomas
Risse et al. eds., 1999) (the “process by which international norms are
internalized and implemented domestically can be understood as a process of
socialization.”) (emphasis in original).
22 Id. at 3–6, 15–16.
23 Id. at 3–5, 18–20.
24 Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization
and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 626 (2004).
25 Id. at 625.
26 Id. at 627.
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Koh argues that acculturation merely marks a midpoint
between persuasion and coercion and is, therefore, in fact
incomplete internalization.27 While Goodman and Jinks
consider acculturation to be distinct from coercion and
persuasion, Koh views acculturation as one step in an
“evolutionary process” in which coercion helps bring about
persuasion and incomplete persuasion is acculturation.28 Once
persuasion is complete, the norm is fully internalized29 in the
sense that the state obeys international law because it
perceives that the norm is part of its “internal value set.”30
Koh also criticizes Goodman and Jinks for failing to provide a
detailed explanation of the mechanism by which domestic
channels influence state compliance.31 Yet, transnational legal
process theory can be criticized because it too suffers from an
inability to fully explain how international legal norms are
internalized.32
B. Transnational Legal Process Theory
Koh defines transnational legal process as “a process
whereby public and private actors, including nation states,
corporations, international organizations, non-governmental
organizations, and individuals interact in a variety of fora to
interpret, enforce, and ultimately internalize rules of
international law.”33 Transnational legal process theory
describes a “dialectical”34 and dialogic process whereby
interactions between various private and public actors induce
state compliance with international law and create
international law because these repeated interactions
Koh, Internalization, supra note 6, at 980.
Id. at 981.
29 Id.
30 Koh, Home, supra note 1, at 644.
31 Id.
32 Moore, supra note 16, at 881.
33 Koh, September, supra note 9, at 339.
34 Koh, New Haven, supra note 2, at 569 (citing Paul Schiff Berman, A
Pluralist Approach to International Law, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 301, 305 (2007));
cf. Melissa A. Waters, Dialectical Regulation: The Murky Middle Ground, 38
CONN. L. REV. 961, 962 (2006) (“Dialectical regulation . . . involves patterns of
institutional interaction resulting from interdependence among regulatory
agencies. This interdependence leads to a significant degree of integration in
regulatory outputs . . . .”).
27
28
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strengthen and modify international legal norms.35 In turn,
the international law that emerges impacts future
noncompliance and, therefore, future interactions.36 Koh refers
to “agents of internalization” in meaning those individuals,
international organizations, or governments that provoke these
interactions and dialogues aimed at inducing state compliance
with international law.37
There are four core characteristics of a transnational legal
process. The first is nontraditional in that domestic and
international law are not distinct categories, but blended.38
The second is non-statist, as both state and non-state actors
are instrumental players in transnational legal processes.39
The third is dynamic because it “transforms, mutates, and
percolates up and down” from the national level to the
international level.40 The fourth is normative; it creates law by
inducing states to comply.41 In addition, there are three phases
within these processes: interaction, interpretation, and
internalization.42
It is important to note that Koh does not disavow other
explanations of state compliance. He thinks explanations of
power, interest, legitimacy, and communitarianism have their
place.43 Rather, his point is these explanations overlook the
critical importance of transnational legal process in inducing
state compliance.44 Specifically, these competing explanations
are not entirely accurate because they fail to adequately
account for internalization.45 Internalization is the key. It is
also the problem.
The classical view of state compliance focuses on horizontal
35 See Eugene C. Lim, A Long ‘TRIP’ Home: Intellectual Property Rights,
International Law and the Constructivist Challenge, 4 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL.
57, 76 (2008).
36 Id.
37 Koh, Home, supra note 1, at 646–55.
38 Koh, Process, supra note 6, at 184.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Koh, September, supra note 9, at 339.
43 Id. at 338.
44 Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law
Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1397, 1401–06 (1999).
45 See Koh, Nations, supra note 6, at 2602–03.
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internalization, but, in Koh’s view, horizontal models must be
combined with vertical models to provide a complete picture of
state compliance.46
Horizontal internalization consists of
treaty conferences, summits, and other similar gatherings
“where nation-states interact in intergovernmental fora, with
the main goal of promoting compliance with international
law.”47 What remains murky is the vertical internalization
aspect of state compliance. Vertical internalization occurs
when agents of internalization, which can be state or non-state
actors, interact with a violating state in a variety of domestic
and international fora to induce compliance with international
law.48 Through full participation in law-creating processes,
states internalize the norms that are the subject of those
processes to the point where they become part of the state’s
“internal value set.”49 This vertical internalization, or
“domestication,” is the most powerful means of enforcing
international law, transmogrifying it from external “their” law
into internal “our” law. The tools of this transformation are
well known to lawyers: legislation, executive action, and
judicial interpretation.50 Senegal has employed all three of
these tools in the Habré case, yet complete internalization
remains elusive.
Thus far I have been imprecise with my terminology. Koh
draws a clear distinction between compliance and obedience.
He defines compliance as occurring when “people are both
aware of the rule and consciously accept its influence, but do so
in order to gain specific rewards (e.g., insurance benefits) or to
avoid specific punishments (e.g., traffic tickets).”51 Obedience
46 Koh, Torturer, supra note 9, at 1146. For an example of an academic
in accord with Koh on this point, but who sees even transnational legal
process and its cousins as insufficient to capture the complex matrix in which
international law operates, see Berman, supra note 2, at 490 (“An
interdisciplinary study of these processes of international, transnational, and
subnational norm development and interpenetration [law and globalization]
does not, of course, render either traditional international law or the idea of
nation-state sovereignty irrelevant, but it does complicate the picture
significantly, prompting the need for a more comprehensive set of inquiries.”).
47 Koh, September, supra note 9, at 339.
48 Id.
49 Harold Hongju Koh, The 2004 Term: Supreme Court Meets
International Law, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 2–3 (2004).
50 Id. at 4.
51 Koh, Home, supra note 1, at 628.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol24/iss1/6

10

200

PACE INT’L LAW REV.

[Vol. XXIV:1

“occurs when a person or organization adopts rule-induced
behavior because the party has internalized the norm and
incorporated it into its own internal value system.”52 For Koh,
the goal is not merely compliance, but obedience.
He
summarizes the relationship between the two as follows: “most
compliance comes from obedience; most obedience comes from
norm-internalization; and most norm-internalization comes
from participation in legal process, particularly transnational
legal process.”53 In other words, obedience is “internalized
compliance.”54 Obedience55 could thus be considered a fourth
phase of transnational legal process proceeding interaction,
interpretation, and internalization.56
Finally, there are three forms of internalization: social,
political, and legal. Social internalization is “when a norm
acquires so much public legitimacy that there is widespread
general adherence to it.”57 Political internalization is when
“the political elites accept an international norm and advocate
its adoption as a matter of governmental policy.”58
Legal
internalization is defined as “when an international norm is
incorporated into the domestic legal system and becomes
domestic law through executive action, legislative action,
judicial interpretation, or some combination of the three.”59
The
transnational legal
process
of
interaction,
interpretation, internalization (social, political, and legal), and
obedience may be summarized as follows:
Normally, one or more transnational actors provokes an
interaction, or series of interactions, with another in a lawdeclaring forum. This forces an interpretation or enunciation of
the global norm applicable to the situation. By so doing, the
moving party seeks not simply to coerce the other party, but to
force the other party to internalize the new interpretation of the
Id.
Koh, September, supra note 9, at 339.
54 Koh, Home, supra note 1, at 629.
55 To clarify, in sections of this article discussing Koh’s transnational
legal process theory the term “compliance” should be read as synonymous
with “obedience,” as Koh defines the term.
56 Koh, Home, supra note 1, at 644.
57 Id. at 642.
58 Id.
59 Id.
52
53
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international norm into its normative system. The provoking
actor’s aim is to ‘bind’ the other party to obey the new
interpretation as part of its internal value set. The coerced
party’s perception that it now has an internal obligation to follow
the international norm leads it to step four: obedience to the
newly interpreted norm.60

As will be explained in more detail below, the above
description of transnational legal process matches what can be
observed in the Habré case. The agents of internalization (the
“Agents”)61 filed a complaint against the former Chadian
President, Hissène Habré, who had been residing in Senegal
since 1990 in contravention of Senegal’s obligation to extradite
or prosecute him under the UN Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
The Agents used
Punishment (“Torture Convention”).62
multiple judicial fora—Senegalese and Belgian courts, the UN
Committee against Torture (the “CAT”), and the International
Court of Justice, and the African Union—in order to spark
interactions with Senegal and force a particular interpretation
of universal jurisdiction and the Torture Convention.63 The
interpretation propounded by the Agents was incorporated into
Senegal’s legal order via amendments to the Penal Code and
Constitution.64 In other words, partial norm internalization
(that is, legal internalization) has occurred. This use of
multiple judicial fora by lawyers is what Koh refers to as
“transnational public law litigation,” which is one of the means
by which transnational legal process operates.65 Unfortunately,
Id. at 644.
I use the term Agents as shorthand for agents of internalization. The
term encapsulates not only Habré’s victims and human rights NGOs, but all
actors, including Senegalese governmental actors, seeking to internalize in
Senegal universal jurisdiction and the obligation to extradite or prosecute.
The composition of the Agents changes as some groups or individuals, for
example, participate in Belgian litigation but others do not. I want to avoid
getting bogged down in minutia and emphasize the idea that whichever
individual or group is striving for internalization in Senegal at any given
moment is acting as an agent of internalization. If the individuals or
organizations involved at a given moment are important enough I will
distinguish them from other Agents.
62 See infra Part IV.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Koh, Litigation, supra note 6, at 2348.
60
61
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what is lacking in the Habré case is the final step: complete
norm internalization and, thus, obedience.
Transnational legal process has been criticized for
espousing the use of transnational public law litigation, which
uses the courts to induce state compliance with international
law. Waters argues transnational legal process suffers from a
significant legitimacy problem because of its commitment to
furthering fundamental human rights through countermajoritarian institutions, such as the courts.66 The riposte to
this argument is that the nature of internalization necessitates
full acceptance of the norm: socially, politically, and legally.67
Obedience, as opposed to compliance, by definition, requires a
norm to become part of the internal value set of society and its
policymakers.68 Transnational legal process is successful only
if the internalized international legal norm possesses a broad
base of support outside the courtroom.
Keohane also criticizes Koh for failing to explain the liberal
democracy bias in favor of internalization. Koh disregards
regime-type as a factor influencing internalization.69 He
prefers to explain internalization as a function of the type of
international legal norm being internalized (e.g. human rights
versus banking standards).70 In contrast, Keohane argues
liberal states are more likely to internalize international legal
norms.71 He identifies four factors that likely contribute to a
successful internalization: (1) transparency of state practice, (2)
connections among professionals (e.g., judges), (3) connections
between social movements and issue-advocacy networks, and
(4) elite accountability to the public.72 According to Keohane,
by excluding regime type from his analysis, Koh only begins to
describe the internalization of international legal norms.73 In
Waters, supra note 5, at 458.
See Chander, supra note 2.
68 Id.
69 Koh, Home, supra note 1, at 674.
70 Id. at 674–75.
71 Robert Keohane, When Does International Law Come Home?, 35 HOUS.
L. REV. 699, 710–11 (1998).
72 Id.
73 Christopher J. Borgen, Transnational Tribunals and the Transmission
of Norms: The Hegemony of Process, 39 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 685, 720–21
(2007).
66
67
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my view, Keohane and Koh’s efforts may be misdirected. Rules
and regimes are possible proximate causes of internalization,
but perhaps not the ultimate causes. The question should not
focus on norm-type or regimes, but on agency, audience, and
context.
The most incisive criticism to date of transnational legal
process theory comes from Raustiala and Slaughter. They
argue that Koh has described internalization as both a
definition of compliance and its cause.74 Internalization cannot
be both dependent and independent variables. It cannot be
cause and effect. Consequently, “rather than explaining why
and when states follow international rules, Koh instead
describes an empirical pathway to obedience—or, more
precisely, a pathway to norm incorporation into domestic law—
and details the ways in which transnational actors and
practices influence this process.”75 To remedy this problem, I
want to probe deeper than an explanation centered solely on
internalization will allow. By focusing on the elemental factors
of agency, we can better understand the variables influencing
internalization and begin to separate the causes of
internalization from the definition of compliance.
Raustiala and Slaughter have also pointed out that
transnational legal process theory suffers from a lack of
analyses across cases.76 As a result, they claim, “Koh cannot
say when non-compliance should occur or what the optimal
response should be.”77 Indeed, one of the criticisms of “first
generation” compliance theorists is that they have not provided
adequate empirical evidence of the mechanisms by which
states are induced to comply with international law.78 What
follows is an attempt to inch toward a “second generation”
approach whereby arguments concerning the mechanics of
Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note 8, at 544.
Id.; see also Asher Alkoby, Theories of Compliance with International
Law and the Challenge of Cultural Difference, 4 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 151,
187 (2008) (“[Koh] describes political and legal interactions leading to
internalization in fairly mechanistic terms . . . at the endpoint the norm
somehow acquired its ‘stickiness’ and states complied with it because it had
been internalized. How this leap takes place . . . is not clear.”).
76 Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note 8, at 544.
77 Id.
78 See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 24, at 624.
74
75
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inducing state compliance are empirically supported.79 The
interviews and media sources relied upon provide strong
empirical support for my argument, demonstrating that the
three factors of agency can aid our understanding of the
internalization of international legal norms. An in-depth
examination of a single case may elucidate some of the
variables influencing internalization and thus offer insights for
more ambitious comparative studies.
III. SPEECH ACTS AND SECURITIZATION THEORY
Before delving into speech acts and securitization theory,
an important question must be answered: why attempt to
explain transnational legal process with a seemingly far
removed securitization theory and an even further removed
linguistic theory on speech acts?80 The short answer is
constructivism. Constructivism, broadly understood, is the
intellectual heritage shared by securitization and transnational
legal process theories. Transnational legal process theory is
partly a product of discourses between international law and
international relations, specifically, its constructivist branch.81
By arguing that agents of internalization can induce
international legal compliance through repeated interactions
with wayward states, transnational legal process theory plainly
adopts constructivist elements. For transnational legal process
theory, as for constructivism, state identity and interests are
not a rational result of an anarchic international structure, but
are the result of a process of interaction between state and nonstate actors that endows states with subjective identities and
interests.82 In other words, “constructivists believe that the
Id.
E.g., Nicholas Onuf, Do Rules Say What They Do? From Ordinary
Language to International Law, 26 HARV. INT’L L. J. 385, 402 (1985) (using
speech act theory to create a typology of all social rules). I am not the first to
use speech acts to further an understanding of international law but, to my
knowledge, I am the first to use speech acts to explain transnational legal
process.
81 See Koh, New Haven, supra note 2, at 570 (“The idea of normativity
connects the Transnational Legal Process School to the ‘Constructivist’ School
of international relations.”).
82 Id.; see Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is What States Make of It: The
Social Construction of Power Politics, 46 INT’L ORG. 391, 395 (1992).
79
80
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interests of states are created—at least in part—through
interaction and can change through interaction.”83 The same is
true for securitization theory, which is the “strongest off-shoot”
of constructivism’s contribution to security studies.84
Securitization theory has taken an additional step in
constructivist thought, reasoning that if agents induce
structural change, then the language of those agents should be
examined through linguistic theory, specifically, speech acts.85
Transnational legal process theory could also benefit from
taking that additional step by building on its constructivist
roots and examining the language of the agents of
internalization. Securitization theory and its critics, like
Balzacq, are a natural starting point for such an examination
because of their extensive use of linguistic theory.
In his seminal work, How to Do Things with Words, Austin
wrestled with the classical distinction between constatives and
performatives. A constative is an utterance which is about the
truth or falsity of what it describes or reports (i.e. a
statement).86 A performative is an utterance that performs an
action.87 Austin’s inability to maintain a meaningful distinction
between constatives and performatives led to his articulation of
speech act theory.88
Austin distinguishes between three types of speech acts:
locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary. By uttering this
very sentence I am doing something; I am in a sense
performing an act.89 This is a locutionary act.90 An
illocutionary act is an utterance “such as informing, ordering,
83 David Bederman, Constructivism, Positivism, and Empiricism in
International Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 469, 477 (2001) (quoting ANTHONY CLARK
AREND, LEGAL RULES AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 128 (1999)).
84 Thierry Balzacq, Constructivism and Securitization Studies, in THE
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF SECURITY STUDIES 56 (Myriam Dunn Cavelty &
Victor Mauer eds., 2011).
85 See id. (“Securitization theory argues that language is not only
concerned with what is ‘out there’ . . . but is also constitutive of that very
social reality[, as] . . . securitization is ‘constructivist all the way down.’”).
86 J. L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 1 (2d ed. 1989).
87 Id. at 5–7.
88 John R. Searle, Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts, 77 PHIL.
REV. 405, 405 (1968).
89 AUSTIN, supra note 87, at 94.
90 Id at 101.
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warning, undertaking . . . i.e., utterances that have a certain
(conventional) force.”91 The utterance: “I do,” in a marriage
ceremony is an illocutionary act because it is the “performance
of an act in saying something.”92 Finally, a perlocutionary act
is “what we bring about or achieve by saying something, such
as convincing, persuading, deterring, even, say, surprising or
misleading.”93 If the norm of universal jurisdiction is fully
internalized in Senegal and Habré is eventually tried for his
alleged crimes, this will be the perlocutionary act performed by
the utterance: “Habré should be fairly tried.” Habermas sums
up speech act theory nicely:
Through locutionary acts the speaker expresses states of affairs;
he says something. Through illocutionary acts the speaker
performs an action in saying something. The illocutionary role
establishes the mode of the sentence . . . employed as a . . .
promise, command, avowal, or the like . . . . Finally, through
perlocutionary acts the speaker produces an effect upon the
hearer. By carrying out a speech act he brings about something
in the world. Thus the three acts that Austin distinguishes can
be characterized in the following catchphrases: to say something,
to act in saying something, to bring about something through
acting in saying something.94

Each one of these acts (locutionary, illocutionary, and
perlocutionary) are the total speech act.95 Thus, the Agents
want to move immediately beyond the locutionary act of
uttering: “Habré should be fairly tried,” and trek to the
perlocutionary act of prosecution. The sought after result, or
perlocutionary act, is obedience by transforming the utterance:
“Habré should be fairly tried,” into a fair trial for Habré.
The Copenhagen School’s (the “CS”) securitization theory
seizes on Austin’s notion of an illocutionary act to explain how
a policy issue is elevated from normal politics to a matter of
national or international security. The CS explains
Id. at 109.
Id. at 99.
93 Id. at 109.
94 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 288–89
(Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984), quoted in Onuf, supra note 80, at 397–98
(emphasis in original).
95 Thierry Balzacq, The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency,
Audience and Context, 11 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 171, 175 (2005).
91
92
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securitization as an illocutionary act:
The process of securitization is what in language theory is called
a speech act. It is not interesting as a sign referring to
something more real; it is the utterance itself that is the act. By
saying the words, something is done (like betting, giving a
promise, naming a ship).96

When a securitizing actor utters “security” in relation to a
referent object (the thing that is threatened) to an audience,
the securitizing actor is acting in saying something.97 For CS,
uttering “security” is the same as uttering: “I promise.” By
saying it, the situation changes, the political becomes a matter
of national or international security.98 The CS thus assumes
that “the enunciation of security itself creates a new social
order wherein ‘normal politics’ is bracketed.”99
One could view the efforts to prosecute Habré in this light.
By uttering: “Habré should be fairly tried,” to the Senegalese
audience, his stay in Senegal becomes an issue of international
concern, implicating universal jurisdiction and the obligation to
extradite or prosecute within the Torture Convention.
However, this view is unsatisfying. Habré has not been
prosecuted, and it has proven an arduous process to convince
Senegalese that universal jurisdiction and the Torture
Convention’s obligation to extradite or prosecute should apply
to him. In the Habré case, the situation clearly did not change
simply by uttering: “Habré should be fairly tried.” It thus
appears the efforts at internalization in the Habré case cannot
be understood as an illocutionary act, such as: “I promise.”
Securitization theory, so understood, is unhelpful in furthering
an explanation of internalization.
The CS is unhelpful in understanding internalization
because it ignores the perlocutionary act and thus contextual
factors. The CS maintains that securitization is a selfreferential practice “because it is in this practice [, the
illocutionary act,] that the issue becomes a security issue—not
necessarily because a real existential threat exists, but because
96 BARRY BUZAN, OLE WAEVER & JAAP
FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 26 (1998).
97 Id.
98 See id.
99 Balzacq, supra note 95, at 171.
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the issue is presented as such a threat.”100 Yet, the CS is quite
clear that merely uttering security is insufficient: “[a] discourse
that takes the form of presenting something as an existential
threat to a referent object does not by itself create
securitization . . . but the issue is securitized only if and when
the audience accepts it as such.”101 On the one hand, the CS
includes the contextual factors of the securitizing agent and the
audience into its theory, but on the other, it implicitly
dismisses the relevance of context by suggesting only the
linguistic rules governing an illocutionary act are relevant in
determining a successful securitization.102 In short, either
securitization is self-referential, looking to the utterance per se,
or intersubjective, looking outside the utterance to the
securitizing agent and the audience.103
Balzacq opts for the intersubjective view because of the
importance of the perlocutionary act.104
The goal of
securitization is “to prompt a significant response from the
other;”105 this response can only be achieved through the
perlocutionary act.106 As Balzacq puts it, “to study
securitization is to unravel the process by which a securitizing
actor induces an audience to agree with a given interpretation
of an event or a set of events.”107 This quotation can be refitted
to apply to a study of internalization in transnational legal
process.
Recall
that
complete
persuasion
is
full
internalization—getting the target country to agree to a norm
such that it becomes part of its internal value set. Examining
internalization in the Habré case necessitates an understanding of the process by which the Agents induce the
Senegalese audience to agree that Habré should be fairly tried
and prosecute him accordingly. In the Habré case, success
comes with the application of universal jurisdiction and the
Torture Convention to prosecute. Amendments to the
Constitution and Penal Code permitting Habré to be lawfully
BUZAN ET AL., supra note 96, at 24.
Id. at 25.
102 See Balzacq, supra note 95, at 177–78.
103Id. at 177.
104 Id. at 177–78.
105 Id. at 175.
106 Id. at 175–76.
107 Id. at 187.
100
101

19

2012]

HUNTING A DICTATOR

209

prosecuted in Senegal are insufficient.
Once the primacy of the perlocutionary act is accepted, one
should consider factors of agency, audience, and context.108
This is because the perlocutionary act is context dependent; it
is “specific to the circumstances of issuance, and is therefore
not conventionally achieved just by uttering particular
utterances, and includes all those effects, intended or
unintended, often indeterminate, that some particular
utterances in a particular situation may cause.”109 The
perlocutionary act is concerned with this securitizing agent’s
ability to convince this audience, in this context, that the issue
should be securitized. Securitization, as with internalization,
can still be understood through speech act theory, but it must
focus on the perlocutionary act. This reorientation allows an
analysis of agency (I am excluding context and audience from
my analysis)110 to aid in understanding Balzacq, securitization,
and, for us, the internalization phase of transnational legal
process.
Balzacq’s discussion of agency’s impact on securitization is
intricate and need not be reproduced in full here. Suffice it to
say what he means by agency is the ability of the securitizing
agent to use discourse to produce agreement among the
audience that an issue should be securitized. Agency, thus,
“involves the capacity of the securitizing actor to use
appropriate words and cogent frames of reference in a given
Id. at 175–76.
AUSTIN, supra note 87, at 14–15.
110 Id. at 192. To understand the role of the audience, Balzacq argues
three factors must be examined: (1) the “audience’s frame of reference,” (2)
“its readiness to be convinced, which depends on whether it perceives the
securitizing actor as knowing the issue and as trustworthy,” and (3) “its
ability to grant or deny a formal mandate to public officials.” Id. An
examination of context “concerns contextual effects on the audience’s
responsiveness to the securitizing actor’s arguments—relevant aspects of the
Zeitgeist that influence the listener, and the impact of the immediate
situation on the way the securitizing author’s sentences are interpreted by
the listener.” Id. at 182. Put simply, when securitization is attempted it
causes the audience to look around to see if the situation requires
securitization of the issue. Id. at 182–83. Balzacq illustrates the point with
the Popish Plot of 1678. Protestants were more responsive to efforts to
securitize the Catholic threat because of the widely held belief among
Protestants that Catholics were responsible for the Great Fire of London in
1666, the perceived economic threat from France’s King Louis XIV, and the
prospect that the King’s Catholic brother may succeed him. Id. at 183.
108
109
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context, in order to win the support of the target audience for
political purposes.”111 Put simply, agency is the power of words
to produce a result.112 Applied to internalization in the Habré
case, the Agents are those who attempt to use words to
persuade their target audience, the Senegalese public and
elites, to agree that Habré should be fairly tried and
prosecuted. Concluding the discussion here would not address
the problem of inadequately explaining why internalization
occurs because the notion of agency, in the form of agents of
internalization, is already incorporated into transnational legal
process theory’s explanation.
For our purposes, the importance of Balzacq’s work is the
factors that he argues influence agency. These factors are: (1)
the validity of the claim itself, (2) linguistic competence, and (3)
the discursive strategy employed.113 Concerning the validity of
the claim, in order for any claim uttered by an agent (in our
case the Agents) to be accepted by the audience (in our case the
Senegalese) and subsequently internalized, it must have a
sufficient level of validity per se. This statement is a rather
pedestrian yet important point, for “the determination of
evidence for truth claims does not only derive from the
authority of the speaker, but emerges also out of the claim
itself.”114 The claim cannot be that Habré should be fairly tried
for a host of crimes with no logical or legally valid connection to
him, such as the attempt to assassinate U.S. President Reagan
in March 1981. Such a ludicrous claim is clearly invalid and
would rightly not produce the desired perlocutionary act. The
claim that Habré should be fairly tried for torture and other
international crimes allegedly committed during his
presidency, however, appears to be sufficiently valid per se.
Therefore, the issue is with the Agents’ linguistic competence
and discursive strategies.
Linguistic competence comprises the idea of “who is
allowed to speak about a subject matter or who can partake in
the debate.”115 Only some individuals have sufficient linguistic
Id. at 192.
See id. at 190.
113 Id. at 190–91.
114 Id. at 191.
115 Id. at 190.
111
112
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competence and are, therefore, influential with respect to a
given issue because of their political and cultural capital,
privileged access to the media, or the trust they command from
the target audience.116 Cultural capital is defined as knowledge of the audience and the cultural context in which that
audience is situated (e.g., the reverence for Senegalese
religious leaders).117 Political capital means the position of
power held by the actor vis-à-vis the audience and the issue.118
Balzacq does not offer a definition of trust, but we may borrow
from Rathburn, for whom trust is “the belief that one’s
interests will not be harmed when placed within the hands of
another.”119 When the Agents argue for Habré’s prosecution,
they are in essence asking Senegalese to place Senegal’s
interests in their hands. The trust dynamics upon which I
focus are between the Senegalese and the Agents and the
Senegalese and the Counter-Agents—those individuals or
groups opposing internalization in the Habré case and, thus,
his prosecution. Moreover, in my view, because linguistic
competence is a function of “the power position of the agent,”120
then, like the Agent’s power position, it is fluid rather than
fixed.
Both the Agents and the Counter-Agents have
attempted to erode each other’s power positions and, therefore,
each other’s linguistic competence.
Finally, the discursive strategy, or “the manner in which
the securitizing actor makes the case for the point at stake,”
can also impact words’ agency.121 Discursive strategies are
based on logical rigor, emotional intensity, or some combination
thereof.122 Cut-to-the-bone, linguistic competence, the validity
of the claim, and discursive strategies explain the
perlocutionary act as a consequence of, respectively, who
speaks, what he says, and how he says it.
As we will see, the problem with internalization in the
Habré case is that the Agents have struggled to secure the
Balzacq, supra note 95, at 191.
Id.
118 Id.
119 Brian C. Rathbun, It Takes All Types: Social Psychology, Trust, and
the International Relations Paradigm, 1 INT’L THEORY 345, 346 (2009).
120 Balzacq, supra note 95, at 190.
121 Id. at 191.
122 Id.
116
117
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levels of capital and trust necessary to possess the linguistic
competence that will bring about the perlocutionary act:
agreement that Habré should be fairly tried and his resultant
prosecution. The Agents are not the only actors with putative
linguistic competence to speak on whether Habré should be
prosecuted. There are many competing voices in the cacophony
and some of these voices opposing Habré’s prosecution
command high levels of cultural and political capital as well as
trust. It is these actors that the Agents must contend with in
order to secure the linguistic competence to produce full norm
internalization.
Thus, building on Balzacq’s critique of securitization
theory to examine the Habré case, we can begin to provide a
more accurate answer to the question of why internalization
occurs. Yet, before moving to this task, I shall demonstrate
that the Habré case is indeed an example of transnational legal
process.
IV. THE HABRÉ CASE AS A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS
Recall that a transnational legal process has four
characteristics: it is (1) nontraditional (a hybrid of
international and national), (2) non-statist (non-state actors
play instrumental roles), (3) dynamic (moving from national
and international venues), and (4) normative (law-creation and
compliance with that law are its aims).123 These four
characteristics are visible in three distinct phases: interaction,
interpretation, and internalization.124 The following description
of the Habré case will largely concentrate on interaction and
interpretation, while Part V will provide a more detailed
account of the internalization phase. If the Habré case exhibits
the above four characteristics and three phases, then we may
reasonably conclude it is an example of transnational legal
process at work.
The first interaction between the Agents and Senegal
occurred with the filing of a criminal complaint against Habré
in a Dakar court in January 2000 on behalf of some of his
victims with the help of both international and domestic
123
124

Koh, Process, supra note 6, at 184.
Koh, September, supra note 9, at 339.
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NGOs.125 This complaint sought to interpret the Torture
Convention and customary law concerning universal
jurisdiction so as to require Habré’s prosecution for the
following alleged crimes: 97 extra-judicial killings, 142 cases of
torture, 100 disappearances, and 736 arbitrary arrests.126
Initially, the relevant governmental actor concurred with the
Agents. Habré was indicted by Judge Demba Kandji for
torture and an investigation was opened for crimes against
humanity, disappearances, and barbarous acts.127 The issue
then became one of internalization, a phase in the process that
has been fiercely contested by Habré and other CounterAgents. After acceptance of the complaint by Judge Kandji,
Habré retaliated by reportedly spending enormous sums of
money to convert a once pro-prosecution Senegalese press into
a pro-Habré one.128
The contested internalization phase continued with the
contretemps of Abdoulaye Wade’s election as President in
February 2000. Immediately, the Executive began to interfere
in the prosecution.129 Madické Niang, Habré’s lawyer, was
appointed special advisor to the President. The Senegalese bar
protested this conflict of interest and Wade responded by
altering Niang’s title to consultant.130 Indeed, Niang’s conflict
125 Diane F. Orentlicher, Whose Justice? Reconciling Universal Jurisdiction with Democratic Principles, 92 GEO. L.J. 1057, 1059 (2004).
126 Reed Brody, Using Universal Jurisdiction to Combat Impunity, in
JUSTICE FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 374, 383 (Mark Lattimer & Philippe
Sands eds., 2003); COMMISSION D’ENQUÊTE NATIONALE [NAT’L COMM’N OF
INQUIRY], LES CRIMES ET DETOURNEMENTS DE L’EX-PRÉSIDENT HABRÉ ET DE SES
COMPLICES [CRIMES AND ABUSES OF THE EX-PRESIDENT HABRÉ AND HIS
ACCOMPLICES] 97–99 (1993) (documenting Habré’s crimes); see also ÉSAÏE
TOÏNGAR, A MEMOIRE OF SURVIVAL, 1982–1986: A TEENAGER IN THE CHAD CIVIL
WAR 16 (2006) (providing an eye-witness account of life in southern Chad in
the early years of Habré’s rule, as follows: “Most of his rebels . . . were quick
to kill people. The only language they knew was Gourane, which was spoken
by few people in Chad . . . if you answered them in French or Sara (the major
dialect of the South), you would be tortured or killed.”).
127 Reed Brody & Helen Duffy, Prosecuting Torture Universally: Hissène
Habré, Africa’s Pinochet?, in INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROSECUTION OF
CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 823 (Horst
Fischer et al. eds., 2001).
128 Dustin N. Sharp, Prosecutions, Development, and Justice: The Trial of
Hissein Habré, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 147, 169 (2003).
129 Id.
130 Id.
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of interest later worsened, as he was named Senegal’s Minister
of Justice, an important position for organizing the Habré trial,
on April 14, 2008.131
After this reshuffling, Senegal rejected the interpretation
of the Torture Convention and universal jurisdiction offered by
the Agents. In July 2000, the Dakar Court of Appeals reversed
Judge Kandji and dismissed the indictment against Habré.132
Four days before the dismissal, on June 30, 2001, the Superior
Council of the Magistracy, presided over by President Wade
and the Minister of Justice, decided to transfer Judge Kandji
from Chief Investigating Judge of the Dakar Regional Court to
Assistant State Prosecutor at the Dakar Court of Appeals.133
In the same meeting, it was agreed that the President of the
Indicting Chamber, Cheikh Tidiane Diakhaté, before whom
Habré’s appeal was pending, would be promoted to the Council
of State.134 The battle to internalize the Agents’ interpretation
of the Torture Convention and universal jurisdiction was being
lost. On March 20, 2001, the Court of Cassation upheld the
Court of Appeals’ dismissal of the indictment.135 At this point,
the efforts to prosecute Habré became not only non-statist and
normative, but dynamic and nontraditional.
A hegira to Belgian courts followed the dismissal of the
complaint in Senegal. In November 2000, some victims filed a
criminal complaint in Belgian courts under its broad universal
jurisdiction law.136 In September 2005, after a four-year

131 Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Chronology of the Habré Case
(Feb. 12, 2009) [hereinafter Chronology]; Press Release, Senegal’s Foreign
Minister Steps Down, AFP (Oct. 2, 2009) (stating that Niang left the Ministry
of Justice in October 2009).
132 Tanaz Moghadam, Note, Revitalizing Universal Jurisdiction: Lessons
from Hybrid Tribunals Applied To the Case of Hissène Habré, 39 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 471, 500 (2008).
133 Brody & Duffy, supra note 127, at 824.
134 Id. The Council of State has jurisdiction, inter alia, over election
disputes and auditing of the government finances.
135 Stephen P. Marks, The Hissène Habré Case: The Law and Politics of
Universal Jurisdiction, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND
THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 146
(Stephen Macedo ed., 2004).
136 See Steven R. Ratner, Belgium’s War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem,
97 AM. J. INT’L L. 888, 892 (2003) (discussing in detail the political and legal
issues surrounding Belgium’s universal jurisdiction law).
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investigation involving a fact-gathering expedition to Chad,137
Belgian Judge Daniel Fransen charged Habré with genocide,
crimes against humanity, torture, and war crimes, issuing an
international warrant for his arrest.138 In interacting with
Belgian governmental actors, the Agents were able to
successfully advocate for their interpretation of the Torture
Convention and universal jurisdiction.
As further evidence of its dynamism and nontraditional
nature, the case moved back to Senegal, where the Dakar
Court of Appeals ruled that, as a former head of state, Habré
enjoyed “immunity of jurisdiction.”139 President Wade then
formally entered the fray by announcing that Habré had one
This proclamation triggered
month to leave Senegal.140
protests by the then UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights, Mary Robinson, and the then UN Secretary-General,
Kofi Annan, both of whom requested that Wade prevent Habré
from leaving Senegal.141 Meanwhile, the Agents sought another
favorable international forum, the CAT, to pressure Senegal to
adopt its interpretation of the Torture Convention.142 In May
2006, the CAT ruled Senegal was obligated under the Torture
Convention to prosecute or extradite Habré for his alleged acts
of torture.143
Wade then appealed to the African Union (“AU”) for a
resolution of the issue.144 The AU created a Committee of
137 Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Belgian Judge Visits Chad to
Probe Crimes of Ex-Dictator Hissène Habré (Feb. 26, 2002).
138 Moghadam, supra note 132, at 504.
139 Id.; Chronology, supra note 131 (stating that on November 25, “the
Indicting Chamber of the Court of Appeals of Dakar rules that it had no
jurisdiction to rule on the extradition request); Press Release, Human Rights
Watch, L’avis de la Cour d’Appel de Dakar sur la Demande d’Extradition de
Hissène Habré (Extraits) [Opinion of the Dakar Court of Appeals on the
Request for the Extradition of Hissène Habré (Extract)] (Nov. 25, 2011).
140 Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Chad: The Victims of Hissène
Habré Still Awaiting Justice (July 11, 2005).
141 Id.
142 Decisions of the Committee Against Torture under Article 22 of the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Commc’n No. 181/2001, CAT/C/36/D/181/2001, ¶¶
9.6–9.9 (May 19, 2006).
143 Id.
144 Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Les Crimes de l’Ancien
Dictateur Tchadien Entre les Mains de l’Union Africaine [The Crimes of the
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Eminent African Jurists mandated to determine the best
available means for trying Habré.145 After reviewing the report
of the Committee, the AU issued its decision on July 2, 2006,
which “[m]andate[d] the Republic of Senegal to prosecute and
ensure that Hissène Habré is tried, on behalf of Africa.”146
Wade agreed to comply with the AU’s decision.147
After Wade’s public agreement to try Habré, legal
internalization proceeded. In February 2007, the Senagalese
Code of Criminal Procedure was amended, permitting
Senegalese courts to exercise universal jurisdiction over crimes
against humanity, war crimes, torture, and genocide.148 In
addition, the Senegalese Constitution was amended in July
2008 to permit Senegalese courts to exercise jurisdiction over
acts that, “when they were committed, were criminal according
to the rules of international law relating to genocide, crimes
against humanity and war crimes.”149 Yet, Senegal has
steadfastly refused to proceed with the Habré trial until
financial support is forthcoming from the international
community.150
It thus appears that political and social
internalization remains incomplete, and the proposed “fourth”
phase of transnational legal process, obedience, has not
occurred.
Nevertheless, the Agents continue to use national and
international fora to interact with Senegal in order to induce
Ex-Chadian Dictator Are in the Hands of the African Union] (Nov. 27, 2005).
145 Decision on the Hissene Habre Case and the African Union,
Assem./AU/Dec.103 (VI), Doc.Assem./AU/8 (VI) Add.9 (Jan. 23-24, 2006).
146 Decision on the Hissene Habre Case and the African Union, Assem./
AU/Dec.127(VII), Doc. Assem./AU/3 (VII) (Aug. 2, 2006).
147 Press Release, Human Rights Watch, African Union: Senegal Agrees
to Try Hissène Habré (July 2, 2006).
148 Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Senegal: EU Parliament Calls
for Support of Hissène Habré Trial (Apr. 26, 2007).
149 2008 CONST. art. 9; Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Senegal:
Government Amends Constitution to Pave Way for Hissène Habré Trial (July
23, 2008).
150 Request for Indication of Provisional Measures Submitted by the
Government of the Kingdom of Belgium, Questions Relating to the Obligation
to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.), 2009 I.C.J. (Feb. 17) (noting
President Wade’s statement that if the international community does not
provide financial support for the Habré trial, he will revoke Habré’s house
arrest); Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Senegal Failing to Act on Trial
of Hissène Habré (June 28, 2007).
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Senegal to comply with the Torture Convention and prosecute
Habré. Availing themselves of the change in Senegalese law,
on September 16, 2008, fourteen Chadian victims filed criminal
complaints in a Dakar court alleging that Habré is criminally
responsible for torture and crimes against humanity.151 In
addition, Belgium filed an application with the ICJ seeking a
ruling that Senegal must either prosecute Habré or extradite
him to Belgium.152 Finally, Habré’s lawyers filed a petition
with the Community Court of Justice of the Economic
Community of West African States (“ECOWAS”), which
requests the court “to stop all [Senegalese] prosecutions and/or
actions against Mr. Hissène Habré.”153 On November 18, 2010,
the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice ruled that Habré
must be tried by an ad hoc international court.154
In
furtherance of this ruling, the African Union and Senegal
recently agreed to establish an international court for the
specific purpose of trying Habré.155
Based on the foregoing, transnational legal process is an
apt theory for analyzing the Habré case. The initial
interactions with Senegalese governmental actors resulted in a
rejection of an interpretation of the Torture Convention and
universal jurisdiction that would require Habré’s prosecution.
Chronology, supra note 131.
Application Instituting Proceedings, Questions Relating to the
Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.) 2009 I.C.J. 1, 15 (Feb. 16).
153 Decision of The Court of Justice of the Economic Community of States
of West Africa (Hissein Habré v. Republic of Senegal), No. ECW/CCJ/
JUD/06/10 ¶ 1 (Nov. 18, 2010).
154 Id. (“[T]he mandate received by [Senegal] from the African Union
confers upon it a mission of conceiving and suggesting all proper modalities
to prosecute and judge strictly within the scope of an ad hoc special procedure
of an international character as is practiced in international law by all
civilized nations.”). This ruling has been criticized as mischaracterizing and
misquoting the African Union’s decision, which called for Habré to be tried in
a competent “Senegalese” venue. In referencing the AU’s decision the court
dropped the word “Senegalese,” which allows the Court to claim that its
decision for trial before an international court is consistent with the AU’s
decision. E-mail from Reedy Brody, Counsel & Spokesperson, Human Rights
Watch, to Caleb J. Stevens, Carter Ctr. Liberia Law Fellow, Rep. of Liber.
Land Comm’n (Nov. 24, 2010, 10:05 PM).
155 Senegal, AU to set up court to try Chad ex-leader, AFP (Mar. 15, 2011),
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5h3lW_qrtuVD6RTXMn
ShjGZhMOrzg?docId=CNG.cf2168ef633c0557172d1154979356d7.d21.
151
152
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This rejection forced the Agents to search for other
international and national fora that could trigger interactions
with Senegal, namely, to engage in transnational public law
litigation.
Thus, the normativity of the campaign to fairly try Habré
has been non-traditional (i.e. neither entirely national nor
international) and dynamic (consisting of almost tempestuous
movements from international to national fora). Those fora
have consisted of Belgian courts, the CAT, the AU, the
ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, and the ICJ, as well as
informal talks with prominent members of the international
community. These repeated interactions with Senegal in
multiple fora resulted in the successful legal internalization of
the interpretation proffered by the Agents. Moreover, the
Agents prodded the government to utilize several methods of
legal internalization: judicial interpretation, executive action,
and legislation. What remains incomplete, however, are the
efforts to induce obedience through social and political
internalization—i.e., the fair trial of Hissène Habré.
V. THE INTERNALIZATION PROBLEM IN THE HABRÉ CASE AS A
PROBLEM OF AGENCY
This section will draw on interviews and media reports to
support my argument that the three factors of agency (claim’s
validity, linguistic competence, and discursive strategies) can
partially explain the inability to induce social and political
internalization in the Habré case and, thus, obedience (i.e., the
perlocutionary act). As noted in Part III, the validity of the
claim: “Habré should be fairly tried,” is not really an obstacle.
The allegations and legal arguments leveled against him
appear to warrant a fair trial.156 Indeed, the amendment to the
The legal proceedings served as a testing ground for the validity of the
Agents’ claim that Habré should be fairly tried. The Court of Cassation
asserted three premises requiring the dismissal of the indictment against
Habré: (1) the Torture Convention is not self-executing and, thus, Senegalese
Constitution Article 98 providing that international law is superior to
statutory law “does not apply,” (2) the Torture Convention requires
implementing legislation to satisfy Article 4’s “jurisdiction to prescribe” and
Article 5’s “jurisdiction to adjudicate,” and (3) although legislation was
passed implementing the “jurisdiction to prescribe” under Article 4, there has
been no legislation implementing Article 5’s “jurisdiction to adjudicate.”
156
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Guengueng v. Habré, Ct. of Cassation (Mar. 20, 2001). Article 5 of the
Torture Convention provides, in relevant part, “[e]ach State Party shall take
such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the
offences referred to in article 4,” i.e. torture, attempted torture, complicity to
commit torture. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 5, opened for signature Feb. 4,
1985, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. The Court of Cassation interpreted Article 4 as
requiring State Parties to exercise “jurisdiction to prescribe” (i.e. to make
torture criminal) and Article 5 as requiring State Parties to exercise
“jurisdiction to adjudicate” (i.e. to vest courts with universal jurisdiction over
torture). Guengueng v. Habré, Ct. of Cassation (Mar. 20, 2001). On August
28, 1996 Senegal added Article 295-1 to the Penal Code, which makes torture
a criminal offense. CODE PÉNAL art. 295-1. The Court of Cassation agreed
with the Court of Appeals that this amendment satisfied Article 4’s
jurisdiction to prescribe. Guengueng v. Habré, Ct. of Cassation (Mar. 20,
2001). The problem, according to both the Court of Appeals and the Court of
Cassation, lay with Article 5’s jurisdiction to adjudicate.
Id. Absent
legislation granting Senegalese courts universal jurisdiction over torture
pursuant to the Torture Convention, Habré could not be prosecuted for
alleged torture committed outside Senegal. Id. The opinion of the Court of
Cassation has been criticized on at least three grounds. First, Constitution
Article 98 provides that treaties are superior to domestic law and Senegal is a
monist legal system that grants treaties direct effect. 2008 CONST. art. 98
(“Treaties . . . ratified or approved are, upon their publication, authority
superior to other laws . . . . ”); see also Moghadam, supra note 132, at 501.
Second, the distinction between “jurisdiction to adjudicate” and “jurisdiction
to prescribe” in the Torture Convention is fundamentally flawed. The
distinction misconstrues the principle of legality. The principle of legality is
geared towards ensuring that a person is aware an act is criminalized in the
legal system to which they are subject. Brody & Duffy, supra note 127, at
834. This is not a jurisdictional issue and, thus, a failure to pass a domestic
law vesting Senegalese courts with universal jurisdiction over torture does
not implicate the principle of legality. Id. Indeed, the Court’s reasoning would
permit a failure to pass implementing legislation under Article 5 as an excuse
for Senegal’s non-compliance with Article 7’s requirement to extradite or
prosecute. Id. at 835. This is contrary to the international legal principle that
domestic law cannot excuse a state’s non-compliance with its international
obligations. Id. at 835–36. Third, there is support for the proposition that
customary international law requires Senegal to either extradite or prosecute
Habré for the acts of torture he allegedly committed. Id. at 837; see also
Regina v. Bartle (Pinochet III), [2000] 1 A.C. 147, 276 (U.K.) (separate
opinion of Lord Millet). Article 7’s requirement to extradite or prosecute
reflects customary international law and thus does not depend on
implementing legislation for legal effect. Brody & Duffy, supra note 127, at
835. The Court of Cassation, however, did not address the issue of customary
international law. Guengueng v. Habré, Ct. of Cassation (Mar. 20, 2001).
Moreover, the CAT found that Senegal has failed to fulfill its obligations
under the Torture Convention by refusing to either prosecute Habré for the
acts of torture alleged in the initial 2000 complaint or demonstrate
insufficient evidence to prosecute. Decisions of the Committee Against
Torture under Article 22 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Commc’n No. 181/2001,
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Senegalese Constitution and Code of Criminal Procedure
demonstrate as much. Consequently, I will focus my analysis
on linguistic competence and discursive strategies.
A. Linguistic Competence or Who Says It
There are multiple actors in the Habré case who
purportedly possess the linguistic competence to speak on the
issue of whether Habré should be fairly tried in Senegal. The
Agents must contend with the Counter-Agents. The most
prominent of which are the marabouts and members of the
Senegalese intelligentsia.
The marabouts head Muslim Brotherhoods, which
command enormous amounts of cultural and political capital
and are widely trusted by the Senegalese.157 There are three
Brotherhoods: Mouridiya (16% of Senegalese are members),
Tijaniya (37% of Senegalese are members), and Qadiriya (3% of
Senegalese are members).158 In 2000, 85.4% of Senegalese
surveyed by Afrobarometer said they had confidence in the
Brotherhoods, and they have traditionally “played a very
significant role in politics, providing a critical alliance with and
support for the ruling party and the government.”159 Indeed,
the Parti Socialiste du Sénégal (“PS”) ascended as the
dominant party because Leopold Senghor, the PS founder and
first President of Senegal, cultivated a political alliance with
the Brotherhoods, especially the Mouridiya Brotherhood.160
The tradition of the Brotherhoods overtly participating in
politics, however, is on the wane. There has been a decline in
the marabouts exhorting their followers to vote for a specific
candidate.161 Nevertheless, the Brotherhoods are regarded as
the guardians of religious and moral life for millions of
CAT/C/36/D/181/ 2001, ¶¶ 9.6-9.9 (May 19, 2006).
157 Richard Vengroff & Michael Magala, Democratic Reform, Transition,
and Consolidation: Evidence from Senegal’s 2000 Presidential Election, 39 J.
MOD. AFR. STUD. 129, 149 (2001).
158 INST.FOR DEMOCRACY IN S. AFR. ET. AL, SUMMARY OF RESULTS: ROUND 4
AFROBAROMETER SURVEY IN SENEGAL 77 (2008).
159 Vengroff & Magala, supra note 157, at 149.
160 Lucy Creevey et al., Party Politics and Different Paths to Democratic
Transitions: A Comparison of Benin and Senegal, 11 PARTY POL. 471, 479–80
(2005).
161 Vengroff & Magala, supra note 157, at 149.

31

2012]

HUNTING A DICTATOR

221

Senegalese.162 Moreover, the marabouts, and the Brotherhoods
they head, still hold sway over many voters’ electoral
decisions.163 In the 2000 Presidential elections the silence of
many marabouts was interpreted by their supporters as
opposition to the incumbent Abdou Diouf.164 Vengroff argues
that the Brotherhoods’ “step-by-step disengagement from the
PS has played a significant role in the democratic transition in
Senegal.”165 The political power of the Brotherhoods, especially
the Mouridiya, was highlighted by the fact that, upon election
as President, Wade built his vacation home in Touba, the
Thus, the
capital of the Mouridiya Brotherhood.166
Brotherhoods are widely regarded as king-makers and trusted
civil society organizations with extraordinary political and
cultural capital.
Habré has shrewdly strengthened the linguistic
competence of the Tijaniya marabouts concerning the issue of
his prosecution.
Habré is a member of the Tijaniya
Brotherhood167 and married to a Senegalese woman from a
prominent Tijaniya family, with whom he has had children.168
Moreover, he is a follower of the recently deceased Tijaniya
marabout, Thirno Mountaga Tall, a man lionized in Senegal for
his resistance to French colonial rule.169 By aligning himself
with Tall’s family,170 Habré secured allies commanding
substantial political and cultural capital and trust in Senegal.
Mr. Thirno’s son, Madani Tall, has expressed an obligation to
Momar Dieng, Crises Idrissa Seck et les chefs religieux portés
disparus: Le silence des Mara [Crises Idrissa Seck and the religious leaders
gone missing: The silence of Mara], LE QUOTIDIEN [THE DAILY] (Sept. 4, 2009),
http://www.africatime.com/Senegal/nouvelle.asp?no_nouvelle=478443&no_cat
egorie=.
163 Vengroff & Magala, supra note 157, at 149.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 150.
166 Id.
167 James Copnall, Moroccan Shrine Unites Africans, BBC (Feb. 18, 2009;
9:11AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7885798.stm.
168 Interview with Aboubacry Mbodj, Vice President, Rencontre Africaine
pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme [African Assembly for the Defense of
Human Rights] (Sept. 1, 2009) [hereinafter Mbodj Interview].
169 Id.
170 Cheikh Yérim Seck & Jean-Dominique Geslin, Habré devant ses
juges?, [Habré before his judges] JEUNE AFRIQUE [YOUNG AFR.] (Oct. 9, 2005),
http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/LIN09105habrdsegujs0/.
162
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protect Habré.171
The head of the Tijaniya Brotherhood, Serigne Mansour
Sy, said he will oppose any attempt to extradite his
“disciple.”172 Other members of the Tijaniya Brotherhood
steadfastly refuse to support the prosecution of Habré
regardless of his innocence or guilt.173 Senegalese
overwhelmingly trust the Brotherhoods, thus if they assert
Habré’s innocence and hypocritical bullying by the West, then
many Senegalese accept these assertions.
Members of
government are also unlikely to defy the Tijaniya Brotherhood
because of their political influence. According to Alioune Tine,
President of Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de
l’Homme (“RADDHO”), the only reason Habré has not stood
trial is because he is benefiting from the protection of the
lobbies maraboutiques, or marabout lobby.174 Tine was quoted
as saying, “Hissène Habré is well acquainted with the
marabout families. Upon arriving in Senegal, he was taken in
by the religious leaders.”175 By closely aligning himself with
the Tijaniya Brotherhood, Habré grants the Brotherhood
expertise in matters concerning him, such as his prosecution.
The linguistic competence of the marabouts is a significant
challenge to the Agents. Human Rights Watch and other
foreign NGOs command less political and cultural capital and
trust than the marabouts. The political and social capital and
trust commanded by the Brotherhoods is nearly unassailable in
Senegal, especially by a foreigner.176 The marabouts have
allegedly used this capital and trust to influence the
government in exchange for financial support from Habré.
When a marabout was asked why his Brotherhood protects
171 Mbodj Interview, supra note 168.
Madani conceded to Rencontre
Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme that if the allegations
against Habré are true, then he should be tried. Id. The problem with that
concession is self-evident: the only means to determine the truth of the
allegations is a fair trial, which Madani will not support until the allegations
are proven to be true.
172 Seck & Geslin, supra note 170.
173 Mbodj Interview, supra note 168.
174 Daouda L. Gbaya, Le dossier Habré est bloqué par Wade [The Habré
case is Blocked by Wade], LE QUOTIDIEN [THE DAILY], May 14, 2009.
175 Id.
176 Telephone Interview with Reed Brody, Counsel & Spokesperson,
Human Rights Watch (May 22, 2009) [hereinafter May 22 Brody Interview].
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Habré, despite the crimes he committed against fellow Muslims
in Chad, the marabout responded candidly, “What do you
want? He has been a strong financial supporter.”177
During Wade’s bid for reelection in 2006, those familiar
with the Habré case suspect the following quid pro quo was
offered by at least one of the Brotherhoods: in exchange for our
political support in the upcoming presidential election, do not
extradite Habré.178 The Agents, such as Human Rights Watch
and Senegalese NGOs, possess limited resources, precluding
the possibility of a nation-wide grassroots campaign to erode
some of the linguistic competence commanded by the
marabouts.179 Moreover, even if the Agents possessed sufficient
resources for such a grassroots campaign, it is highly unlikely
that it would be able to appreciably undermine the protection
granted to Habré by the Tijaniyas.
Members of the intelligentsia (other than those who are
Agents) take divergent positions, and, as well-educated
Senegalese, members of the intelligentsia necessarily command
a certain level of cultural and political capital and trust
concerning the Habré case. L’Association Sénégalaise pour les
Nations-Unies (“ASNU”), takes a moderate position, declaring
that Senegal should try Habré in accordance with the AU
mandate and with full protection of the defendant’s rights.180
ASNU, however, condemned all international pressure on
Senegal.181 This criticism of international pressure is an
implicit rebuke of the Agents.
Other members of the
intelligentsia, especially Professor Oumar Sankharé of Cheikh
Anta Diop University in Dakar, roundly and passionately
condemn the efforts of the Agents to prosecute Habré.182
The linguistic competence commanded by Habré himself
177 Interview with Source Familiar with the Case.
Because of the
political sensitivity of the case in Senegal, the source requested to remain
anonymous.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Mamadou Diallo, Jugement de Hissène Habré: L’Asnu contre toute
pression sur le Sénégal [Judgment of Hissène Habré: ASNU Against all
Pressure on Senegal], LE QUOTIDIEN [THE DAILY], Aug. 31, 2006.
181 Id.
182 E.g. Oumar Sankharé, Affaire Hissène Habré ou affaire Me Seye?
[Hissène Habré Affair or Me Seye Affair?], ZOOM TCHAD, Oct. 12, 2008.
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must also be considered. Since the original complaint was filed
in 2000, Habré has launched an aggressive media campaign.183
Habré allegedly uses his wealth to influence the Senegalese
media.184 As Reed Brody elliptically put it, “[i]n 2005, there
were still significant parts of the press that appeared to
respond to outside pressures more than fact.”185 Upon Habré’s
initial arrest by Senegalese authorities in 2005 pursuant to
Belgium’s arrest warrant, the Senegalese media possessed a
noticeable tenor in Habré’s favor.186 As a result of his wealth,
it appears Habré has secured privileged access to the
Senegalese media and, thereby, bolstered his power to speak on
the issue of his prosecution and, therefore, his linguistic
competence.
B. Discursive Strategies or How They Say It: Logical Rigor and
Emotional Intensity
The Agents employ three discursive strategies: (1)
highlight the venality of the marabouts protecting Habré, (2)
focus on the Senegalese victims of Habré’s rule, and (3)
emphasize that it is in Senegal’s interests as a member of the
international community to prosecute Habré. The first is a
combination of logical rigor and emotional intensity; the
second, is purely of emotional intensity; and the third is purely
of logical rigor.
The Agents have attempted to squelch the linguistic
competence of the Tijaniya marabouts by pointing to the
financial support Habré provides them. RADDHO and Human
Rights Watch allege the corruption of Habré’s Tijaniya
protectors. This allegation appears to be reasonable, given the
shocking admission by one marabout mentioned above.187
RADDHO and Human Rights Watch reportedly accused Habré
of bribing the Tijaniya marabouts with approximately US

See supra Part IV.
See supra Part IV.
185 May 22 Brody Interview, supra note 176.
186 Id.
187 Mbodj contends that the loyalty of the “fanatics” protecting Habré is
driven by the wealth he bestows upon them. Mbodj Interview, supra note
168.
183
184
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$600,000.188 A political cartoon satirizes Habré’s use of the
marabouts. In the cartoon, Habré is piggybacking a marabout
who uses a talisman to ward off a Belgian Judge and the
skeletons of Habré’s victims at the same time that notes of the
Senegalese currency, the CFA franc, fall from his pockets189
and the marabout shouts that they should look for others.190
In addition, the Agents launched a media campaign
intending to show Senegalese that Habré committed crimes
against their fellow citizens. Reed Brody admits one of “the
reasons that we lost in 2000 and 2001, was because we did not
convince the Senegalese public that Hissène Habré is the
criminal we say he is.”191 Brody estimates that, currently,
about half the media coverage on the Habré case is proprosecution, whereas, for years, the media coverage favored
Habré.192 The limited resources of Human Rights Watch,
RADDHO, and others have been utilized for a media campaign
targeting the Senegalese political and intellectual class.193
They even hired a media consultant to advise them on the most
effective use of the media.194
Some of the products of these efforts include a series of
articles detailing the abuses committed by Habré’s regime
against the Senegalese. As early as January 2000 an article in
a Senegalese paper appeared informing the Senegalese public
that two of their fellow citizens were victims of Habré’s
regime.195 The two victims were Demba Gaye and Abderamane
188 Human Rights Watch accuse Habré a soudoyé un chef réligieux
sénégalais avec 300 millions [Human Rights Watch Accuses Habré of Having
Bribed a Senegalese Leader with 300 million], L’OBSERVATEUR [THE
OBSERVER], Oct. 26, 2005; Habré “achète” un religieux sénégalais à 350
millions [Habré “Buys” a Senegalese Cleric with 350 Million], LE QUOTIDIEN
[THE DAILY], Oct. 26, 2005.
189 Pour sa protection Hissène Habré aurait remis plus de 300 millions de
Fcfa à un chef religieux sénégalais [For his Protection Hissène Habré Would
Have Given More Than 300 Million of CFA Francs to a Senegalese Religious
Leader], LE MATIN [THE MORNING], Oct. 26, 2005.
190 Id.
191 May 22 Brody Interview, supra note 176.
192 Id.
193 Interview with Reed Brody, Counsel & Spokesperson, Human Rights
Watch (May 20, 2009) [hereafter May 20 Brody Interview].
194 May 22 Brody Interview, supra note 176.
195 Deux Sénégalais parmi les victims [Two Senegalese Among the
Victims], WALF FADJRI, Jan. 26, 2000.
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Gaye, arrested in Chad on August 23, 1987.196 A more recent
article detailed the story of Abdou Rahmane Guèye. Upon
arriving in Chad, he was accused of espionage, had a
substantial amount of money confiscated, was imprisoned, and
then tortured.197 Gueye was only released after the then
Senegalese President, Abdou Diouf, intervened on his behalf.198
An October 2005 news article provided an account of two other
Senegalese victims of Habré’s regime. One Senegalese victim,
Clément Abaifouta, claims that he was imprisoned for alleged
membership in the Zaghawa ethic group, which Habré was
targeting at the time.199 This article was accompanied by an
editorial declaring, “[i]t is time for Senegal to correct the error
it committed in protecting Habré for 15 years.”200
By focusing on Habré’s Senegalese victims as a discursive
strategy, Human Rights Watch and other NGOs hope to
overcome the foreign, or “other,” stigma that undermines their
linguistic competence.201 Stories, like those above, are
reiterated by RADDHO in order to reveal the propinquity
between Habré’s crimes and Senegal such that Senegalese view
them as committed against Senegalese and not just distant
Chadians.202 The Senegalese victims of Habré’s rule serve as
the “bridge” between the Agents and the Senegalese public,
providing “the passion and the determination of the victim.”203
Finally, the Agents host conferences in Dakar to argue
that it is in Senegal’s interests to prosecute Habré. One such
conference, in May 2010, was organized by l’Association
Tchadienne pour la Promotion et la Defense des Droits de
l’Homme (“ATPDH”), in order to inform Senegalese and the
international community of the latest developments in the
Id.
El Malick Seck, Abdou Rahmane Gueye Victime de Hissène Habré:
Pourquoi j’ai été torture pendant 6 mois en prison [Abdou Rahmane Gueye
Victim of Hissène Habré: Why I was Tortured for Six Months in Prison],
EXPRESS NEWS, May 14, 2009.
198 Id.
199 Moustapha Diop, Des victims sénégalaise et tchadiennes racontent
l’enfer des geôles d’Habré [Senegalese and Chadian Victims Tell of the Hell of
Habré’s Jails], LE POP, Oct. 9, 2005.
200 Id.
201 May 20 Brody Interview, supra note 193.
202 Id.
203 Id.
196
197
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Habré case.204 The participants were local Muslim and
Christian leaders, a member of parliament, a business owner,
and a university professor.205 Jacqueline Moudeina, a Chadian
lawyer for the victims and member of ATPDH, argued Senegal
has an undeniable interest in combating impunity: “Our
heartfelt plea is for a strong civil society that stands up against
impunity in Africa. It is not in a spirit of vengeance that we
pursue this; we simply want to eradicate impunity.”206 The MP
who attended the conference, Abdoulaye Babou, vowed to raise
the Habré issue before the National Assembly.207
Unfortunately, this vow has not produced a trial.
There is evidence that the interest argument is gaining
traction in Senegal. One news article argued the repeated
pressure by the international community is damaging
Senegal’s reputation and foreign policy goals, that there is no
legal reason to prevent Habré’s prosecution.208 However, the
author of the editorial professed sympathy for the argument
that Habré should not be prosecuted in the interests of
sovereignty and pan-Africanism.209
The discursive strategies employed by the Agents contend
with fiery rhetoric from the Counter-Agents. The CounterAgents use four distinct discursive strategies: (1) pan-African
unity against Western injustice, (2) Western hypocrisy in
harrying Habré while granting impunity to others, (3) the
alleged Senegalese victims are lying, and (4) prosecuting Habré
would be contrary to Senegalese traditional hospitality. The
first discursive strategy is steeped in an anti-colonial
mentality. Aside from a logical argument presented by Habré’s
attorneys, that foreign aid for his trial would prejudice the
proceedings against him,210 the Counter-Agents’ discursive
204 Bakary Oumarou, Les dernières evolutions du dossier Hissein Habré
[Recent development in the Hissein Habré case], LE ROSEAU, Nov-Dec. 2009, at
1–2.
205 Habré Trial Would Be Blow to Impunity, IRIN, (June 2, 2010), http://
www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=89327.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Mbaye Samb, Reflet: Qu’attend donc le Sénégal pour juger l’ancien
dictateur tchadien? [Reflection: When will Senegal Judge the Former Dictator
of Chad?], WALF FADJRI, June 19, 2006.
209 Id.
210 Habré Trial Would Be Blow to Impunity, supra note 205.
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strategies are unabashedly emotional.
One of the most prominent Counter-Agents is Oumar
Sankharé. He has written lengthy, almost sermonic, editorials
condemning efforts to prosecute Habré. One article described
Habré as the “courageous former Chadian Head of State” and
the Habré case as “having revealed to the entire world a
monstrous image of a state where all the laws are violated,
where all violations are legalized.”211 According to Sankharé,
this latter characterization is imposed by “Whites” and
Western powers who want to force Senegalese to separate
themselves from their traditional valor, morals, and
religions.212 The article continues by denouncing the West as
hypocritical in seeking Habré’s prosecution when Europe,
especially Belgium, has committed a myriad of crimes against
Africa.213 The pan-African view is aptly captured in the
following quotation, also from Sankharé, “Habré is precisely
this hero and this African resistor who put an end to the
imperialist visions of France . . . . ”214 The article contends that
Senegal is succumbing to pressure from the West for euros and
petro-dollars, and that Senegal should not aid the West in their
attempts to imprison African presidents.215
There appears to be no logical consistency between
Soukharé’s discursive strategies. In the same editorial in
which he exhorts Senegalese to embrace a pan-African defense
of Habré, he excoriates former Libyan President, Muammar alGaddafi, and Chadian President, Idriss Déby, for their crimes
during Habré’s rule.216 For example, in an open letter sent to
Habré, Sankharé proclaims that Habré is a martyr for African
resistance.217 The letter reads more like a manifesto of anticolonial African resistance, yet the letter condemns the use of
Sankharé, supra note 182.
Id.
213 Id.
214 Oumar Sankharé, Affaire HH—pour une reconciliation nationale au
Tchad [HH Affair—for National Reconciliation in Chad], WALF FADJRI, July
21, 2009.
215 Id.
216 E.g., id.
217 Oumar Sankharé, Lettre à Hissène Habré: vous êtes un martyr de la
résistance africaine [Letter to Hissène Habré: You are a Martyr of African
Resistance], WALF FADJRI, June 30, 2006.
211
212

39

2012]

HUNTING A DICTATOR

229

Gaddafi’s money in damaging Senegalese power.218 Sankharé
apparently feels no compunction in calling for Africans to unite
against the West in one sentence and, in another, attacking the
West for ignoring the role played by Idriss Déby during Habré’s
rule.219
Other Counter-Agents use similar discursive strategies.
One article concurs with Sankharé, arguing the hypocrisy of
targeting Habré without also prosecuting his accomplices, the
United States and Idriss Déby.220 Habré’s lawyers also try to
deflect attention towards Gaddafi and Déby. They claim the
AU decision mandating that Senegal try Habré was rendered
by a committee of pretend jurists and experts corrupted by
Gaddafi.221 They assert the AU decision is merely part of an
international plot against Habré, of which Idriss Déby is an
architect.222
The Counter-Agents also try to discredit the claim that
Senegalese were victimized by Habré.223 One article authored
by Sankharé alleges Abdou Rahmane Guèye was not a victim
of Habré’s regime because he never set foot in Chad.224 The
article goes on to repeat the refrain that Habré is an African
hero and the campaign to prosecute him is another Western
injustice against Africa.225
The final discursive strategy comes from Habré’s
attorneys, who argue prosecution would be contrary to
traditional Senegalese hospitality. The Wolof word teranga
translates into English as “hospitality.”226 This discursive
strategy relies on teranga when calling attention to the fact
See id.
See Sankharé, Affaire, supra note 182.
220 Nadjikimo Benoudjita, Habré, Déby et les autres . . . à la barre!
[Habré, Déby and Others . . . to the Witness Box!], LE TEMPS [THE TIMES], Feb.
8, 2000.
221 Tchad: Affaire Habré [Chad: Habré Affair], ALWIHDA, June 30, 2006.
222 Id.
223 See Oumar Sankharé, Les Justiciers du Président Habré [The
Avengers of President Habré], TCHADONLINE, http://tchadonline.com/les-jus
ticiers-du-president-habre/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2012).
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 Interview with Djibril Aziz Badiane, Gen. Secr’y, l’Organisation
Nationale des Droits de l’Homme [The Nat’l Org. for Human Rights] (Sept. 2,
2009).
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that, since he arrived in Senegal, Habré has lived in peace as a
good Muslim, married a Senegalese woman from a prominent
Tijaniya family, had Senegalese children, and used his wealth
to become an important supporter of local businesses.227
Habré’s attorneys argue it would contradict teranga to
prosecute him.228
Several Senegalese whom I interviewed expressed the view
that there is a lack of political will to try Habré.229 By
analyzing the efforts to internalize universal jurisdiction and
the obligation to extradite or prosecute under the Torture
Convention according to the three factors of agency, the reason
for this lack of political will becomes clearer. The Agents,
especially the foreign NGOs, must contend with the marabouts,
who command higher levels of cultural and political capital as
well as trust. In addition, for most of the period since the
original complaint was filed in 2000, Habré has enjoyed
privileged access to the Senegalese media. The advantageous
linguistic competence of the marabouts is coupled with the
Counter-Agents’ discursive strategies based on emotional
intensity, which plays to the fears and prejudices of the
Senegalese with apparent effectiveness. Although I cannot say
conclusively which has been the greater source of success for
the Counter-Agents, linguistic competence or discursive
strategy, it is telling that the Agents’ more logical discursive
strategies have thus far been ineffective.
VI. CONCLUSION
Approaching the internalization problem via speech act
and securitization theories provides a useful analytical
framework. This framework can help explain why, after more
than ten years, social and political internalization remains
elusive in the Habré case.
There are multiple actors
commanding linguistic competence on the issue who adamantly
oppose Habré’s prosecution. Moreover, the Agents’ discursive
Mbodj Interview, supra note 171.
Id.
229 Interview with Bachir Fofana, Journalist, Le Populaire [The Popular]
(Sept. 4, 2009); Interview with Assane Ndiaye, President, l’Organisation
Nationale des Droits de l’Homme [The Nat’l Org. for Human Rights] (Sept. 7,
2009).
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strategies have been countered with other discursive strategies
designed to persuade Senegalese that Habré should not be
prosecuted. Consequently, political and social internalization
and, thus, the perlocutionary act (i.e. agreement to prosecute
and prosecution) have not occurred.
The foregoing analysis offers up a previously unexplored
approach to transnational legal process’ internalization
problem. In connecting with speech act theory and Balzacq’s
critique of securitization theory, I attempted to demonstrate
that the question of why internalization occurs can be
explained by focusing on the nano-process of agency. Although
this paper falls short of conclusively demonstrating the utility
of agency in explaining internalization, it opens up some future
lines of inquiry. First, future work should provide an analysis
of multiple case studies. Second, my article deliberately
excludes from its purview an analysis of audience and context,
which Balzacq argues contribute to a successful securitization.
My analysis of agency’s influence on internalization in the
Habré case is intended only as a starting point. The context in
which Senegalese find themselves may give credence to the
discursive strategies of the Counter-Agents. The fact that the
trial is sought in Senegal may render Senegalese responsive to
discursive strategies of pan-Africanism, Western hypocrisy,
and hospitality. This is a bit of a tautology, but the point is the
success or failure of discursive strategies (i.e., their ability to
elicit supportive responses from the audience) is influenced by
the context in which they are employed. Senegal is a former
French colony sensitive to French influence over its former
colonies, of which Chad is one. Some Senegalese criticize, for
example, the decades-long presence of French troops in Senegal
as evidence of French domination.230 The extent to which such
contextual factors impact internalization should be
investigated.
In addition, the role of the audience should be examined.
In order to understand the influence of the audience on
internalization, one must discern the ability of the audience
(e.g., Senegalese) “to grant or deny a formal mandate to public

France Closes Senegal Military Bases, BBC, (June 9, 2010, 8:38 AM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/africa/10273849.
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officials.”231 Thus, in well-established democracies, the public
and elites will be able to transmit their views on the issue to
public officials. In a nascent democracy, such as Senegal, this
transmission may be corrupt.232 Indeed, we have seen evidence
of corruption in the Habré case through Wade’s apparent
interference with the judiciary.233 Keohane’s argument that
regime type influences internalization could aid this analysis.

Balzacq, supra 95, at 192.
Freedom in the World 2010: Senegal Country Report, FREEDOM HOUSE
(May 3, 2010), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,FREEHOU,,SEN, 456
d621e2,4c0cead5b,0.html (finding that Senegal is partly free and noting
President Wade’s consolidation of power at the expense of the rule of law).
233 See supra Part IV.
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